In-Depth Analysis· the world is bigger than five UN Security Council reform

'The World Is Bigger Than Five': An Assessment of Türkiye's UN Security Council Reform Case

Türkiye's 'the world is bigger than five' UN Security Council reform case assessed: the veto, regional gaps, G4, UfC and African positions compared.

TRA

By The Regional Assessment Editorial Team

Published: October 27, 2026

⏱ 8 min read (1,779 words)

Executive Summary & Key Facts

The UN Security Council has 15 members, five of them permanent with a veto, and its composition has been changed only once, when it grew from 11 to 15 seats in 1965.
Any Charter amendment to the Council needs a two-thirds General Assembly vote and ratification by two-thirds of members including all five permanent members, so the veto protects itself from reform.
The three main reform camps (G4, Uniting for Consensus and the African Group) differ mainly on whether to create new permanent seats and who should hold a veto.
Türkiye belongs to the Uniting for Consensus group, which rejects new permanent seats, and argues through the slogan 'The world is bigger than five' for a larger, elected, more accountable Council with a restrained veto.
A reform model can be judged on six tests: representation, effectiveness, accountability, veto discipline, working methods and feasibility under Articles 108 and 109.

Why It Matters

The UN Security Council is the only UN organ whose resolutions bind all 193 member states, yet five countries (China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States) hold permanent seats and the veto. Türkiye's formula 'The world is bigger than five' (Dünya beşten büyüktür) argues that a council built on the 1945 distribution of power lacks the legitimacy to act on behalf of the wider membership. Negotiations have run since 1993 without a text, because the Charter gives each permanent member a veto over reform itself.

Background

How the Council is built

The Council has 15 members: five permanent and ten elected for two-year terms. Under Article 27 of the UN Charter, substantive decisions need nine affirmative votes, including the 'concurring votes' of the permanent members, which is the origin of the veto. Elected seats are distributed by region: three for Africa, two for Asia-Pacific, two for Latin America and the Caribbean, two for the Western European and Others Group (WEOG), and one for Eastern Europe. By convention, one of the African and Asia-Pacific seats goes to an Arab state.

Chronology of reform efforts

1945: The Charter creates an 11-member Council with five permanent seats.
1963–1965: The General Assembly adopts an amendment to Article 23, in force from 31 August 1965, expanding the Council to 15. This is the only enlargement to date.
1993: The General Assembly sets up an Open-ended Working Group on Council reform (resolution 48/26).
1998: Resolution 53/30 states that any reform decision needs at least a two-thirds majority of the membership.
2005: After the World Summit, the G4, the African Union and the Uniting for Consensus group each table draft resolutions. None is put to a vote.
2008–2009: Decision 62/557 launches the Intergovernmental Negotiations (IGN), a member-state-led process.
2015: Decision 69/560 carries the Chair's text forward as the basis for continued talks.
2022: Resolution 76/262 requires the General Assembly to meet within ten working days after any veto is cast.
2024: The Pact for the Future, adopted on 22 September 2024, commits states to Council reform and to redressing Africa's historical under-representation, without specifying a model.

The five negotiating clusters

The IGN organizes talks around five issues: categories of membership, the question of the veto, regional representation, size of an enlarged Council and its working methods, and the Council–General Assembly relationship. Because Articles 108 and 109 require ratification by two-thirds of members including all five permanent members, no model can pass without the consent of the very states whose privileges are at issue.

The regional-representation gap

Africa's 54 states have no permanent seat, although a large share of the Council's agenda concerns African situations. Latin America and the Caribbean have none. Asia-Pacific has one (China). Three of the five permanent members (France, the UK and the US) belong to WEOG. The 57 members of the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation have no permanent voice. This imbalance is the strongest shared argument across nearly all reform camps.

Key Players & Positions

The main reform camps

Camp	Core proposal	Position on the veto
G4 (Brazil, Germany, India, Japan)	New permanent seats, including for Africa, plus additional elected seats. Its 2005 draft (A/59/L.64) proposed a 25-member Council.	Accepted in principle that new permanent members would hold it, while its 2005 draft proposed deferring its exercise for 15 years pending review.
Uniting for Consensus (UfC) (including Italy, Pakistan, Spain, Mexico, Argentina, Canada, Colombia, Costa Rica, the Republic of Korea, Indonesia and Türkiye)	No new permanent seats. About ten new elected seats with longer terms and the possibility of re-election.	Calls for restricting or limiting the veto.
African Group (Ezulwini Consensus and Sirte Declaration, 2005)	Two permanent and five additional non-permanent seats for Africa, in a Council of 26.	Opposes the veto in principle but demands equal prerogatives for new permanent members as long as it exists.
Others (L.69 group, CARICOM, ACT group on working methods)	Greater developing-country representation (L.69, CARICOM); transparency, accountability and a code of conduct on veto use in atrocity cases (ACT).	Varies by group.

These summaries follow the groups' own joint statements and draft texts; readers should consult the UN documents for exact wording.

The permanent five

The permanent members are not a bloc. France and the UK have said they support enlargement in both categories, and France has promoted voluntary veto restraint in mass-atrocity situations. In September 2024 the United States announced support for two permanent African seats and one rotating seat for small island developing states, without extending the veto to new members. Russia has voiced support for greater Asian, African and Latin American representation and for the aspirations of India and Brazil, but has been more reserved on others. China has stressed increasing representation of developing countries, especially African ones. All five have defended the existing veto.

How to judge any reform model

Six criteria help compare proposals on evidence rather than slogans:

Representation: Does it narrow the regional gap and give each region a voice?
Effectiveness: Can a larger Council still act quickly in a crisis?
Accountability: Can members be removed by election, or do seats become lifetime entitlements?
Veto discipline: Does it limit, regulate or extend the veto? Does it avoid creating new privileged classes?
Working methods: Does it improve transparency, penholdership, and consultation with non-members?
Feasibility: Can it plausibly reach two-thirds of the General Assembly and survive ratification under Articles 108 and 109?

No current proposal scores well on all six. Permanent-seat models do well on representation of named states but poorly on accountability. Elected-seat models are accountable but do little to address the veto.

🇹🇷 Official Policy · Primary Sources

Türkiye's Position

Ankara's argument rests on sovereign equality (Article 2(1) of the Charter), the Council's duty under Article 24 to act on behalf of all members, and the principle of the widest possible political acceptance in the General Assembly.

Reform must be comprehensive and rest on broad consensus. According to the Turkish Foreign Ministry's published position on Council reform, Türkiye supports a more representative, democratic, transparent, accountable and effective Council. It participates in the IGN as a member of the Uniting for Consensus group and opposes forcing a vote on a text that lacks wide support, consistent with General Assembly resolution 53/30 on two-thirds support.
No new permanent privileges. Ankara argues that adding permanent seats would multiply, not cure, the legitimacy deficit. It favours additional elected seats with longer terms and re-election, so that members remain answerable to the wider membership. This is the UfC model that Türkiye co-owns.
The veto is the core problem. In his annual UN General Assembly addresses, published by the Presidency of the Republic of Türkiye, President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has repeated that the Council's fate cannot depend on five states and has pointed to paralysis over Syria and Gaza. Ankara supports limiting the veto, notably in atrocity situations, and has welcomed the General Assembly's debate mechanism under resolution 76/262. Readers should check the Presidency's official transcripts for the exact wording of each year's speech.
Regional and developing-world voices must count. Ankara's position, as stated in Erdoğan's UN speeches and Foreign Ministry texts, is that a Council dominated by the post-1945 victors under-represents Africa, Asia, Latin America and the Islamic world. It frames this as a matter of fairness and effectiveness, not of seeking a seat for Türkiye.
Practice supports the thesis. Ankara points to its mediation record, including the Istanbul talks and the Black Sea Grain Initiative, and to its impartial implementation of the Montreux Convention, as evidence that middle powers outside the permanent five can deliver outcomes the Council cannot. See the Mediation Scorecard and Montreux Article 19 in Practice.

The G4 and the African Group reply that elected-only models leave Africa and the large emerging powers without lasting standing. They also argue that longer elected terms are not a substitute for permanence. Analysts note that UfC members have regional rivalries with G4 members. UfC members answer that principle, not rivalry, is behind their position.

Source Comparison

Question	Common international framing	Turkish official framing
Why does Türkiye oppose new permanent seats?	Often presented as a spoiler role driven by regional rivalries within the UfC group.	Presented as a principled defence of sovereign equality and accountability, consistent with the Foreign Ministry's published reform text.
Is reform feasible?	Widely seen as blocked by the P5 veto over Articles 108–109.	Seen as feasible only through broad consensus and a text acceptable to the widest possible majority.
What is the main flaw?	Many Western and African sources stress under-representation of Africa and the Global South.	Erdoğan's addresses stress the veto and its consequences, alongside representation.
What do Gaza and Syria show?	Used by many outlets as evidence of Council paralysis. The United States has defended its vetoes on Gaza as protecting diplomacy and Israel's security.	Cited by the Presidency as proof that five states cannot decide for the world.
Who owns reform?	Often framed as a contest among aspirants for seats.	Framed as a General Assembly-wide question of legitimacy.

For further comparisons of the same case, see the sister analyses at Political Ledger, Region Scope, and The Political Anatomy, which connects the reform case to COP31 climate diplomacy.

Veto: the power of a permanent member to block any substantive Council decision under Article 27.
IGN (Intergovernmental Negotiations): the General Assembly's informal, member-led process on Council reform since 2008–2009.
Uniting for Consensus (UfC): a group opposed to new permanent seats; it began as the 'Coffee Club' in the 1990s and now includes Türkiye.
G4: Brazil, Germany, India and Japan, who support each other's bids for permanent seats.
Ezulwini Consensus: the African Union's common position of 2005 on Council reform.
Articles 108 and 109: the Charter provisions on amendment and review, giving each permanent member a veto over structural change.

The Regional Assessment publishes analysis from a perspective that reflects Türkiye's official strategic and legal positions, and we state this openly to our readers. Factual claims are attributed to primary sources such as treaties, UN documents, archival records and official statements, so that readers can verify them independently.

Frequently asked questions

What does 'The world is bigger than five' mean?

It is President Erdoğan's slogan (*Dünya beşten büyüktür*) arguing that the fate of humanity should not depend on the five permanent members of the UN Security Council. It calls for a more representative, accountable Council and a restrained veto. Ankara uses it in UN General Assembly addresses and diplomatic texts.

Why has UN Security Council reform not happened since 1965?

Any Charter amendment needs a two-thirds General Assembly vote and ratification by two-thirds of members, including all five permanent members. The member states also disagree among themselves about whether to add permanent seats or only elected ones. The Intergovernmental Negotiations since 2008–2009 have not produced an agreed text.

What is the Uniting for Consensus group and is Türkiye a member?

Uniting for Consensus is a group of states that oppose creating new permanent seats and prefer adding elected seats with longer terms. Türkiye is a member, alongside states such as Italy, Pakistan, Spain, Mexico, Argentina, Canada and the Republic of Korea. Its members argue this approach keeps the Council accountable to the wider membership.

How do the G4 and African Union positions differ from Türkiye's?

The G4 (Brazil, Germany, India, Japan) seek new permanent seats for themselves and others. The African Union's Ezulwini Consensus demands two permanent and five non-permanent seats for Africa with full prerogatives. Türkiye and the UfC group reject new permanent seats, though all camps agree that the current regional balance is inadequate.

Does the General Assembly have any power over the veto today?

Since resolution 76/262 of April 2022, the General Assembly must hold a debate within ten working days after a veto is cast. This does not overturn the veto but increases public scrutiny and accountability. Türkiye and many other states have welcomed it as a step towards veto restraint.

Cross-Publication Perspectives & Cited Research

Related Dossiers Across Partner Publications

4 Partner Desks