Mediation Scorecard: What Türkiye's Istanbul Talks and Gaza Diplomacy Delivered

Why It Matters

Türkiye's mediation record is best judged on measurable outputs, not on rhetoric. On four criteria (access, trust, implementation and durability), Ankara delivered its strongest results on narrow humanitarian and technical deals: a Black Sea grain corridor that moved roughly 33 million tons of grain, and prisoner and body exchanges hosted in Istanbul. Comprehensive political settlements, whether between Russia and Ukraine or in Gaza, have remained out of reach, and this article says where and why.

Background

Chronology of the Main Tracks

• 10 March 2022: Foreign ministers Sergey Lavrov (Russia) and Dmytro Kuleba (Ukraine) met in Antalya on the margins of the Antalya Diplomacy Forum, hosted by Türkiye. It was the first senior in-person Russia–Ukraine ministerial contact after the invasion and produced no ceasefire.
• 28 February 2022: Türkiye announced that it would apply Article 19 of the 1936 Montreux Convention, restricting the passage of belligerents' warships through the Turkish Straits. See Montreux Article 19 in Practice: How Closing the Straits Shaped Black Sea Risk.
• 29 March 2022: Russian and Ukrainian delegations met face to face in Istanbul. Ukraine presented a framework built on neutrality in exchange for security guarantees. Russia announced it would reduce military activity around Kyiv and Chernihiv. Within weeks the process stalled, and the parties still dispute why.
• 22 July 2022: In Istanbul, Russia and Ukraine each signed separate arrangements with Türkiye and the UN that created the Black Sea Grain Initiative and a Joint Coordination Centre in Istanbul. A separate UN–Russia memorandum addressed Russian food and fertilizer exports.
• September 2022: A prisoner exchange involving Turkish facilitation saw five Ukrainian (Azov) commanders transferred to Türkiye under an arrangement between Presidents Erdoğan and Zelensky. They were returned to Ukraine in July 2023, which Moscow criticized as a breach of understandings.
• 17 July 2023: Russia declined to extend the grain arrangement, ending it. According to UN reporting, close to 33 million tons had been shipped.
• May–July 2025: Direct Russia–Ukraine talks resumed in Istanbul (16 May, 2 June and 23 July). The first round led to a 1,000-for-1,000 prisoner exchange. Later rounds produced further exchanges, including of wounded and young prisoners and the return of the bodies of fallen soldiers. Neither side moved toward a ceasefire.
• October 2023 onward (Gaza): After the 7 October 2023 Hamas attack and Israel's military campaign in Gaza, Ankara pursued ceasefire diplomacy, humanitarian aid, contacts with Hamas and the Palestinian Authority, and calls for a guarantor mechanism. Türkiye was among the states involved in the October 2025 Sharm el-Sheikh ceasefire arrangements alongside Egypt, Qatar and the United States.

For parallel treatments, see Frontline Diplomacy's account of the Istanbul talks and The Political Anatomy's overview of Türkiye as mediator. This article deliberately does not re-explain the mechanics of the grain deal; it scores it.

The Scorecard: Four Criteria

The criteria follow our Editorial Principles on testable, source-attributed assessment:

1. Access: Can the mediator convene or reach all relevant parties?
2. Trust: Do the parties accept the mediator as sufficiently fair, in their own words?
3. Implementation: Did agreed measures actually happen?
4. Durability: Did outcomes survive beyond the first crisis?

These ratings are the editors' qualitative judgments based on public record, not official figures.

Where Outcomes Fell Short

• No political deal: The 2022 Istanbul framework was never signed. Russia says Ukraine walked away under outside pressure. Ukraine and its Western partners say Russian conduct, including the evidence from Bucha, and demands that amounted to capitulation, ended the process. Both accounts agree on one point: Istanbul remained the only venue both sides were willing to use.
• Grain deal ended: Russia argued that its own export commitments under the UN memorandum were not met. The UN said it had worked to facilitate them. The arrangement lasted about a year, not the longer period its architects intended.
• Exchanges stayed transactional: Swaps worked as discrete deals, but did not build toward a ceasefire.
• Gaza: Türkiye's contacts with Hamas gave it access others lack, yet Israel questions its impartiality, which limits Ankara's ability to be a full broker rather than an interlocutor and guarantor candidate.

Key Players & Positions

Russia

Moscow has said, through the Russian Foreign Ministry and Presidential statements, that it values Istanbul as a venue and has argued that the 2022 drafts should be the basis of any talks. It insists on addressing what it calls the root causes of the conflict, and has linked grain exports to the easing of obstacles to its own agricultural and fertilizer trade.

Ukraine

Kyiv, according to President Zelensky's office and the Foreign Ministry, seeks a ceasefire, the return of prisoners, and respect for its territorial integrity, and welcomes Türkiye's humanitarian role. It rejects any settlement that rewards territorial seizure and has pressed for security guarantees.

United Nations

The UN Secretary-General's office treated the grain arrangement as a landmark humanitarian instrument and publicly pushed for its renewal. It also reported on the difficulties of the parallel Russian-export track.

Israel

Israeli officials say Türkiye's relations with Hamas, which Israel, the United States and the European Union designate as a terrorist organization, disqualify Ankara from an impartial role. Israel has objected to any Turkish military presence in Gaza arrangements.

Palestinian Actors, Egypt, Qatar and the United States

The Palestinian Authority and Hamas both maintain channels with Ankara. Egypt and Qatar have been the principal mediators on ceasefire terms, with the United States as the key external guarantor. Türkiye works alongside them rather than replacing them. See Interstate Journal on Türkiye and Gaza for further context.

Source Comparison

Western media often frame Türkiye as a transactional balancer seeking leverage, while Turkish sources frame the same activity as principled, conflict-reducing diplomacy. The documentary record supports both observations: the outputs are real, and so is the diversity of interpretation. Compare Gazetteer of Nations for a broader view of Ankara's diplomacy.

Key Terms & Related Guides

• Montreux Convention (1936): The treaty governing passage through the Turkish Straits; Article 19 restricts belligerent warships in wartime. See Montreux Article 19 in Practice.
• Joint Coordination Centre (JCC): The Istanbul-based body of UN, Turkish, Russian and Ukrainian officials that inspected and tracked grain shipping.
• Guarantor mechanism: A proposed structure in which third states would underwrite compliance with a Gaza settlement.
• Two-state position: A Palestinian state on 1967 lines alongside Israel, as called for in UN resolutions.
• Mediation vs. facilitation: Mediators propose terms; facilitators host and carry messages. Türkiye's record is strongest in the second role.

Further reading on this site: The Regional Assessment home, About The Regional Assessment, Editorial Principles, and The World Is Bigger Than Five. More sister-publication analysis: Record of Nations.

Perspective Note

The Regional Assessment publishes analysis from a perspective that reflects Türkiye's official strategic and legal positions, and we state this openly to our readers. Factual claims are attributed to primary sources such as treaties, UN documents, archival records and official statements, so that readers can verify them independently. Sections marked 'Türkiye's Position' reflect official Turkish policy as stated by Turkish government sources. Published by The Regional Assessment Editorial Team.